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Abstract 
Declining fertility is one of the top policy issues in South Korea. To increase the birth 
rate, the government of South Korea has been enacting several fertility encouragement polices. 
Although almost all of the birth encouragement policies have been led by the central government, 
a childbirth grant program was developed by primary local governments themselves. The grant 
levels vary significantly between local governments. 
I examine what explains the differences in the childbirth grant level by analyzing twelve 
years (2004-2015) of panel data with a fixed-effects model.  Prior studies indicate that the extent 
of demand for a policy and the availability of financial resources are the main factors influencing 
welfare policies of South Korean local governments. From this point of view, my study focuses 
on population fluctuation and fiscal capacity of the local governments as the primary explanatory 
variables while including several socio-economic and political factors as control variables. 
According to my estimation results, population change has a statistically significant 
impact on the grant level (generosity of the grants) offered by primary local governments in the 
provinces while it has no significant impact in the metropolitan cites. By contrast, the fiscal 
capacity has a subtle impact only on the grant levels of the municipalities in the metropolitan 
cities. Interestingly, the grant level of nearby local governments has a positive effect both in the 
provinces and metropolitan cities. 
The results indicate the local governments in the provinces respond more sensitively to 
population change regardless of their fiscal capacity. Most provinces have more small 
municipalities facing a shrinking population compared to metropolitan cities. While the stated 
goal of childbirth grants is increasing births, a competition among local governments not to lose 
younger people to nearby local governments contributes to increasing childbirth grants.  
This suggests the central government intervene in the childbirth grant policy of local 
governments to alleviate financial burden on the small and poor local governments as well as to 
increase the birth rate.  
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1. Introduction 
South Korea is experiencing a drastic decrease in fertility. The country also takes in few 
long-term immigrants. Consequently, its population is aging. Since the 1960s, the birth rate of 
South Korea has been on a downward trend. In 2005, it reached the lowest rate among OECD 
countries with 1.08 children per woman. 
Figure 1.1: Birthrate of South Korea against Average of OECD Countries (1960-2013) 
 
Source: OECD 
A declining birth rate and aging population lead to a shrinking labor force. Also, taxes to 
support government pensions for the elderly have to increase. Continuing on the same trajectory 
will lead to a less vibrant economy. Accordingly, the South Korean government has been 
enacting several policies to increase the birth rate. They include tax incentives and daycare 
subsidies. 
Almost all childbirth encouragement policies have been led by the central government of 
South Korea and applied uniformly across the country. There is one exception, however: A 
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childbirth grant program was developed by primary local governments (PLG) 1  themselves 
without a guideline or financial support from the central government. This unique, bottom-up 
grant program was started by two local governments (Ulleung-gun and Hampyeong-gun) in 2002. 
Over the next ten years the grant program spread to nearly all primary local governments despite 
a controversy about the effectiveness of the grants in increasing the birth rate. 
Figure 1.2: Spread of Childbirth Grant Program by Year (2002-2015) 
 
While most primary local governments now provide childbirth grants, how much they 
pay varies significantly. For example, in 2015, the minimum grant for the third child’s birth was 
zero, while the maximum was 12,000,000 Korean won (about $11,000). Even within the same 
province there can be large disparities: An average grant paid by Pyeongchang-gun was about 
ten times larger than that paid by adjacent Hoengseong-gun. What accounts for the differences? 
Interest in local government policies has increased steadily in South Korea since local 
autonomy was launched in the 1990s (Choi, 2012). Recently, as many media cover childbirth 
grant programs and disparities between the grants provided by different municipalities, there is a 
                                                 
1 There are 226 primary local governments in South Korea, 74 PLG in metropolitan cities and 152 
in provinces. 
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rising interest in the size of childbirth grants. While there are several studies exploring the grant 
program’s effectiveness and diffusion phenomenon, there are few studies explaining the 
determinants of the generosity of the grants. Considering several issues related with the grants – 
inequality, financial burden and ripple effects2, there is a need to look at the factors influencing 
the level of childbirth grants. Therefore, this study examines what causes the differences in 
childbirth grants paid out by primary local governments. 
 
2. Literature Review 
The childbirth grant program is one of several fertility encouragement policies in South 
Korea. The generosity of the grants is determined by primary local governments themselves. 
This study will review existing studies about the effectiveness of fertility policies of local 
governments and policy diffusion to provide a background on the local childbirth grant program. 
Subsequently, previous studies that analyzed the factors affecting local government policies, and 
especially social welfare policies, will be reviewed because they might shed some light on why 
some local government adopt more generous policies than others.  
Effectiveness of Fertility Encouragement Policies 
Existing studies about the effectiveness of fertility policies examine whether the birthrate 
substantially increases as a result of fertility encouragement policies. Choe (2015) used a fixed –
effects model to analyze the effectiveness of fertility encouragement policies by South Korean 
metropolitan municipalities. She found that policies directed towards expanding childcare, 
educational service support, maternity and child-care leave had significant effects on birth rate 
while financial support such as direct payments to parents for births did not.  
                                                 
2  For example, childbirth grants made up about 50% of the children welfare budget in Cheon-An 
city in Chungcheongnam-do province in 2009 (Lee, J., 2009). Increasing childbirth grants means reducing 
resources for other programs. Also, the childbirth grant level of a local government affects that of adjacent 
local governments. (Lee, S., 2013) 
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Findings about the effectiveness of the childbirth grant programs in South Korea vary 
between studies depending on sample, time period and analysis model. For instance, the studies 
looking at all primary local governments revealed the grant program has a significant impact on 
the birth rate of primary local governments (Choi. 2012; Park & Song. 2014). However, the 
studies for the local governments in metropolitan cities conclude that the program has no 
significant impact on the birth rate (Seok. 2011; Lim. 2012). Table 2.1 shows a systematic 
overview of the existing evidence. 
Table 2.1: Previous Studies on the Effectiveness of Childbirth Grants in South Korea 
Study 
Dependent  
variable 
Explanatory 
variable 
Sample & 
Time period 
Analysis  
method 
Finding 
Seok. 
(2011) 
Birth rate 
Weighted 
average grant 
multiplied by 
childbirth grant 
by birth order 
25 PLO (primary 
local governments) 
in Seoul 
metropolitan city. 
2005-2009 
Fixed-effect 
No significant effect of the grant on 
birth rate. 
Lim. 
(2012) 
Birth rate 
childbirth grants 
by birth order 
 
74 PLO in 6 
Metropolitan cities 
and 12 PLO in 
Chungcheongbuk-
do province. 
2004-2011 
Difference in 
Difference, 
Fixed effect 
No significant effect of the grant on 
birth rate in the metropolitan cities. 
Marginal effect on the second child 
birth in the province. 
Baek. 
(2012) 
Birth rate 
Childbirth grants 
by birth order 
 
151 PLO in 
provinces. 
2008-2010 
Ordinary 
least 
squares 
No significant effect of the grant on 
birth rate. 
Choi. 
(2012) 
Number of 
child births 
Childbirth grants 
by birth order 
213 PLO in 
national level. 
2002-2011 
Fixed effect, 
Instrumental 
variable 
The increase of the grant by 
1,000,000 Korean Won increases 
the birth rate of first, second, and 
third child by 7.7%, 2.3% and 0.6%, 
respectively. 
Park & 
Song. 
(2014) 
Birth rate 
Weighted 
average 
multiplied by 
childbirth grant 
by birth order 
230 PLO in 
national level. 
2005-2011 
Fixed-effect 
If the average of grants increases to 
double, the birth rate is expected to 
increases by 1.54%. 
Song 
& Kim. 
(2014) 
Migration 
of young 
women 
(20-39 
years old) 
Weighted 
average 
multiplied by 
childbirth grant 
by birth order 
230 PLO in 
national level. 
2005-2011 
Fixed-effect 
The grants work as a positive 
motivation to move for young 
women who are more susceptible to 
childbirth. 
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Policy Diffusion 
Policy diffusion refers to a process in which a new policy adopted by a government is 
later adopted by other governments resulting in the gradual increase of the number of 
governments using that policy (Eystone, 1977). Policy diffusion is also defined as a process in 
which a policy choice of one government is influenced by the policy choice made by another 
government (Braun & Gilardi, 2006). Such policy diffusion can occur in various policy areas 
such as taxation, environment and social welfare. Existing studies on policy diffusion (Braun & 
Gilardi, 2006; Shipan & Volden, 2008) present a variety of causes to policy diffusion including 
learning, competition, imitative adaptation, and coercion. 
In a study that analyzed the diffusion phenomenon of childbirth grant programs of local 
governments in South Korea, Lee, J. (2012) stated that the grant programs showed three typical 
characteristics of policy diffusion (i.e. following an S-shaped pattern, geographical clustering, 
and diversity amid commonality). He also confirmed that a local government’s decision to adopt 
the policy was significantly influenced by the number of adjacent local governments that 
introduced the policy, birthrate, and the status of fertility policy establishment by the central 
government. By contrast, political factors like the election time of a local government have little 
influence. In a study by Lee, S., (2013) who analyzed panel data of 219 primary local 
governments from 2002 to 2009, results indicated that the most important factors for a local 
government to adopt a childbirth grant are the fiscal capacity of a local government and the 
economic condition of that region. The study, in particular, showed that the childbirth grant level 
of adjacent regions affects how a local government decides the generosity of their own grants. 
These two studies, however didn’t consider the locational difference between a large city and a 
rural community, which may determine the pattern of policy choices. 
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Policy Determinants of Local Governments 
As to the determinants of policy, some scholars focus on socio-economic factors while 
other scholars put more emphasis on political-administrative factors. Also, there are empirical 
studies pointing out the other factors such as an impact of adjacent governments’ policy as one of 
the important policy determinants (Lee, C., 2009). Figure 2 shows diverse factors which could 
have an impact on a local government policy.  
Figure 2: Determinants of a Local Government Policy 
 
 
 
Socio-economic 
determinants  
Political-administrative 
determinants  
Other determinants 
population, education, 
income, urbanization, 
economic condition, 
culture, etc. 
 
election, competition 
among   parties, 
organizational structure 
& capacity, etc. 
 
policy of adjacent local 
governments, advocacy 
coalition, fiscal ability 
incrementalism, etc. 
 
There are some relevant lessons in U.S. studies of policy variation between the states.     
V. O. Key’s analysis of Southern politics suggests interparty competition and voting rate of low-
income voters can have a significant impact on the welfare policy of state government. When 
there is a keen competition between parties, the policy process becomes more responsive to the 
needs of people (V.O.Key, 1949; Soss, Schram, Vartanian, & O’Brien, 2003). Meanwhile, Dye 
(1992) concluded that social welfare policy decisions are better explained in terms of economic 
development factors rather than political factors after analyzing groups of factors: socio-
economic factors (urbanization, industrialization, income, education), political factors 
(dispersion of party control, competition between parties, proportional inequity among resident 
representatives), and other factors (public health, social welfare, expressway, etc.).  
Policy of a Local Government 
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In South Korea, in spite of a relatively short history of local autonomy3, there are several 
studies exploring diverse factors influencing the policy of local government. With respect to 
welfare policy determinants of local governments, unlike policy decisions at the national level4, 
the influence of political factors such as election time and competition among parties tend to be 
insignificant while socio-economic factors such as population and fiscal capacity were found to 
have significant effect on policy decisions by local governments. (Kim, B., 1995; Kang, 2012; 
Kim, G., 2013; Lee, S. 2013; Kim, K., 2014, Kim, J. 2015). Table 2.2 summarizes the findings of 
these studies. 
Table 2.2: Studies on the Determinants of South Korean Local Governments’ Policy 
Study 
Dependent 
variable 
Independent & Control Variables Finding: policy determinants 
Kim, B., 
(1995) 
Expenditure per 
capita 
Population, population density, aging population 
ratio, the rate of recipient of national basic livelihood 
guarantees, fiscal independence, tax share per 
capita, # of residents per public official, election 
Population, fiscal 
independence,  tax share 
per capita, population 
density 
Kim, G., 
(2013) 
Social welfare 
budget ratio 
Youth population ratio, aging population ratio, child 
population ratio, the disabled ratio, the rate of 
recipient of national basic livelihood guarantees, 
population density, fiscal independence, local tax 
per capita, political party of mayor, # of social 
welfare regulations 
Youth population ratio, fiscal 
independence 
Kim, K., 
(2014) 
Elderly welfare 
budget ratio 
Aging population ratio, elderly employment rate,  
economically active population ratio, GRDP (gross 
regional domestic product), GRDP per capita, fiscal 
independence, local tax per capita 
Elderly population ratio, 
fiscal independence 
Ko, 
(2014) 
Health care 
budget per capita 
Elderly population ratio, the rate of recipient of 
national basic livelihood guarantees, local tax 
burden per resident, the number of hospital, drinking 
rate, smoking rate, suicide rate, type of local 
government , political party of mayor 
Elderly population ratio, 
political party of mayor 
Kim, J., 
(2015) 
Social welfare 
expenditure per 
capita 
Aging population & child population ratio, population 
density, the rate of recipient of national basic 
livelihood guarantees, fiscal independence rate, 
type of local government , election, political party of 
mayor, local tax per capita 
Aging population & child 
population ratio, fiscal 
independence rate 
                                                 
3 Since 1990s, the election for local governors and mayors has been held in South Korea. Before 
the election, the central government appointed the governor and mayor of each local government. 
4 In studies on social welfare policies In Korea on national level, it was found that political factors 
have significant effect on policy decision (Hwang, 1997; Park, B. 2006). 
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As the prior studies indicate, various factors can have effects on the decision making on 
local government policies, and the answer to the question of what factors have more effects is 
determined variedly based on the detailed contents of policies and the policy-making 
environments of each local government. Regarding a social welfare policy of South Korean local 
governments, most studies reveal that social factors have more effects on the social welfare 
policies than political factors. The policy of a local government can be defined as the means for 
addressing a social problem of its region. In this respect, South Korean local governments tend to 
react more sensitively to the factors representing the demand for its policy in that the policy is 
the means for addressing a social problem of that region. 
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
The prior studies I reviewed indicate that the extent of demand for a policy and financial 
resources available are the main factors influencing social welfare policies of South Korean local 
governments. Population change is a social factor that represents the demand for childbirth 
grants. Losing young people means there is a less vibrant economy, there have to be cuts to the 
local government, and there will be fewer representatives in the National Assembly5. Thus, there 
is a need for a local government to increase population or at least to stop the outflow of 
population by increasing the birth rate or attracting young couples to its region (Song & Kim, H., 
2014).  
In addition, as shown in Table 3, local governments in South Korea are financially 
dependent on the central government. Many of their projects receive financial support from the 
central government. However, there is no subsidy for the childbirth grants. It means that the local 
governments have to execute the programs with their own revenues. 
                                                 
5 The size of organization and the number of seats in the National Assembly are determined 
based on population of the each primary local government. 
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 Table 3: Fiscal Independence Rate6 of South Korean Primary Local Governments 
Year Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
2004 66.8 10.6 47.0 93.3 
2005 71.5 8.8 51.9 93.9 
2006 69.5 9.3 45.8 92.8 
2007 67.4 9.6 39.6 91.7 
2008 65.7 10.1 36.4 90.4 
2009 65.0 10.9 33.7 91.4 
2010 62.3 11.4 30.8 91.6 
2011 62.3 10.8 33.0 91.8 
2012 62.1 10.6 32.8 90.1 
2013 61.3 10.6 31.9 90.0 
2014 54.8 10.4 27.8 84.6 
Source: Korea Statistical Information Service (KOSIS) 
My study therefore focuses on population and fiscal independence as the determinants of 
childbirth grants. Also, other socio-economic and political factors which seem to have an 
influence on the dependent variable will be used as control variables. 
Figure 3: Research Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 The fiscal independence is an inverse measure of a local government’s dependence of its 
budget on the central government, and it is computed as follows:  
Fiscal independence rate = 
Local tax+other local gov′t income−municipal bond
Total local government accounting budget
 x 100 
Population 
Fiscal Independency 
  The Level of  
  Childbirth Grants 
Other Variables: 
adjacent governments’ childbirth grants, inflation, 
population density, birth rate, childcare center rate, 
marriage rate, divorce rate, political party of mayor, 
election period 
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The hypotheses of this study are as follows: 
a. “If the population of a local government decreases, the childbirth grants offered by the 
government will tend to increase.”  
b.  “If the fiscal independence rate of a local government increases, the childbirth grants 
offered by the governments will tend to increase.”  
 
4. Data and Variables 
This study uses twelve years (2004-2015) of panel data on 2247 primary local 
governments in South Korea. I collected the childbirth grants data from each local government 
through the Korea Public Information System (KPIS)8, and double checked odd looking data by 
telephone. The other data were collected from the Korea Statistical Information Service (KOSIS), 
primary local governments and the Korea National Election Commission (KNEC). 
The grant level often varies significantly depending on birth order. Thus, the dependent 
variable, childbirth grants, is measured as a weighted average because it is more appropriate to 
measure the actual budgetary burden on local governments. The weighted average is calculated 
by multiplying childbirth grant by birth order with the component ratio of the number of births 
by birth order as the weighted value.  
As shown in Figure 4.1, childbirth grants considerably increased over the course of time, 
and the grant size increased with birth order. The margin of increase in childbirth grants tends to 
increase with birth order. Also the disparity in the grant level between local governments 
increased over time.  
                                                 
7 Although there are 226 primary local governments in the South Korea, I exclude two cities: 
Chunchoen-si and Changwon-si. This is because Chunchoen-si has never had the childbirth grant policy, 
and Chanwon-si was created by merger in 2010. 
8 The KPIS is a web-based system (www.open.go.kr) where people can request information from 
public organizations. 
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Figure 4.1: Average Level of Childbirth Grants by Birth Oder and Weighted Average 
 
Interestingly, the grant level of primary local governments (PLG) in provinces is much 
higher - about three times than that of metropolitan municipalities. 
Figure 4.2: Difference in Weighted Average of Grants between Province and Metropolis 
       
 
0
200,000
400,000
600,000
800,000
1,000,000
05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15
C
hi
ld
bi
rth
 G
ra
nt
, K
or
ea
n 
W
on
 (1
10
0 
K
R
W
 ≒
 1
 U
S
D
) 
Year 
First Child 
Second Child 
Third Child 
Weighted Average 
C
hi
ld
bi
rth
 G
ra
nt
, K
or
ea
n 
W
on
  
 PLG in metropolis 
  PLG in Province 
Year 
15 
 
Figure 4.3 shows the average percentage of births by birth order from 2004 to 2015. The 
first child accounted for the largest proportion at 51.8%, while the second child accounted for 
38.3% the third onward about 9.9% of the total number of childbirths. Based on the figures, it 
was found that about 90% of the total number of childbirths were first and second children.       
One of the interesting things is that the families with several children were somewhat more 
common in the provinces than metropolitan cities. 
Figure 4.3: Average Percentage of Births by Birth Order (2004-2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Explanatory variables are population size and fiscal independence rate of each primary 
local government. The fiscal independence rate shows the degree of financial independence of a 
local government from the central government. 
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Control variables include several socio-economic and political factors such as marriage 
rate and political party of the mayor. All of the variables and data sources are as follows. 
Table 4: Variables and Data Source 
Variables Description Source 
Dependent  
variable 
Childbirth grants 
Weighted average of childbirth grants in Korean 
Won 
Local 
gov’t 
Explanatory  
variables 
Population The size of population 
KOSIS 
www.kosis.kr 
Fiscal independence  
rate 
Sum of local tax and other income by local 
government subtracted by outstanding value of 
municipal bond, and all divided by total local 
government’s annual accounting budget 
KOSIS 
Control 
variables 
The grant level of 
nearby  local 
governments 
Weighted average of childbirth grants of the 
province or metropolitan city to which a 
municipality belongs 
KOSIS 
Inflation rate Consumer price index KOSIS 
Population density The number of people per square kilometers KOSIS 
Birth rate Total fertility rate KOSIS 
Childcare center rate The number of childcare center per 1,000 people KOSIS 
Marriage rate The number of marriages per 1,000 people KOSIS 
Divorce rate The number of divorces per 1,000 people KOSIS 
Political party of 
mayor 
Dummy    1: progressive party 
                  0: the other parties 
Local 
gov’t 
Election period 
Dummy    1: election year or the previous year 
                  0: the other years 
KNEC 
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5. Analysis and Findings 
Analysis Methodology: Fixed Effects Model 
The primary aim of this study is to examine the impact of two explanatory variables -
population size and fiscal independence rate - on local governments’ childbirth grants. Since the 
childbirth grant level is set by each local government, the largest source of endogeneity would be 
time-invariant factors such as a local preference for larger families and historic or cultural 
attractiveness of a city to people which should not vary much over time. To address the potential 
endogeneity from time-invariant factors, I use a fixed effects model. If the omitted time-invariant 
variables were uncorrelated with the included time-varying covariates, a random effects model 
would also be a consistent estimator, and it would be more efficient (Hsiao, 2003). However, for 
the reasons I describe above, I suspect that the independent variables are correlated with the 
inherent local characteristics. A Hausman test9 rejects the null hypothesis of no correlation. 
Therefore, the fixed effects model is a more robust model choice. 
In a basic form, the estimation equation of interest is: 
log(Granti,t+1)= αi + β1log(Populi,t-1 ) + β2Indepeni, t + β’3Xi,t  + γt + εi,t 
where Grant  is the weighted average of childbirth grants, Popul is the size of population, 
Indepen is fiscal independence rate, X is set of controls, ε is error term, i is each local 
government, and t is year. The grant and population variables are logarithms10 of each value. The 
dependent variable is entered as a lead variable, and the population as a lagged variable to take 
into account the budgetary process11 of South Korean local governments. 
                                                 
9 The Hausman test result is attached in Appendix. 
10 I transform the variables by log to correct positively skewed distributions. 
11 Generally, the decision on the next year budget of a local government is processed from 
September to December.  Thus, local governments use population statistics of previous year when they 
draw the next year budget because several current statistics are not likely to be available at that time. 
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Estimation Results 
Table 5 summarizes the estimation results for the determinants of primary local 
governments (PLG)’ childbirth grants. 
Table 5: Estimation Results 
Childbirth grant level 
Coefficient 
(1) Whole PLG (2) PLG in Province (3) PLG in Metropolis 
Population -0.698 
(0.2228) 
-1.462* 
(0.0168) 
1.555 
(0.2701) 
Fiscal independence rate 0.0125
*** 
(0.0007) 
0.00763 
(0.0780) 
0.0350*** 
(0.0003) 
Nearby local governments’ 
grant level 
0.395*** 
(0.0000) 
0.277*** 
(0.0000) 
0.442*** 
(0.0000) 
Inflation rate -0.00967 
(0.8432) 
0.0958 
(0.1129) 
-0.264* 
(0.0249) 
Population density 0.201 
(0.7448) 
0.723 
(0.2880) 
0.145 
(0.9142) 
Birth rate 0.0865 
(0.4874) 
0.0468 
(0.6989) 
0.299 
(0.5659) 
Childcare center rate 0.0407
*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0426*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0523 
(0.0503) 
Marriage rate -0.000142 
(0.2094) 
-0.000162 
(0.1842) 
-0.000411 
(0.1101) 
Divorce rate -0.0368 
(0.5416) 
0.000387 
(0.9948) 
-0.0257 
(0.9070) 
Political party of mayor 
(progressive party) 
0.0985* 
(0.0133) 
0.0327 
(0.4310) 
0.299** 
(0.0074) 
Election period -0.242
* 
(0.0483) 
-0.166 
(0.2502) 
-0.384 
(0.2728) 
N 1802 1317 485 
The number of PLG 224 150 74 
p-values in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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There are several things to notice. First, as shown in Table 5, population has a statistically 
significant impact on the childbirth grant level of primary local governments in the provinces 
while it has no significant impact on that of metropolitan municipalities at a 95% confidence 
level. If the population of a local government decreases by 1 %, the childbirth grant level is 
expected to increase by 1.46% in provincial municipalities. It indicates that the local 
governments in provinces are more responsive to the population change. This may due to the fact 
that the provinces have more small towns that suffer from a serious depopulation problem. 
As described in the literature review, the fiscal independence rate tends to positively 
affect social-welfare expenditure of South Korean local governments. However, the fiscal 
independence rate has only a subtle impact (coefficient: 0.035) on the grant level just for 
metropolitan municipalities. It implies that many primary local governments, especially those in 
the provinces, tend to draw the budget for childbirth grants regardless of their fiscal conditions. 
One of the interesting things is that the grant level of nearby municipalities has a positive 
effect on a primary local government’s grant level both in the provinces and metropolitan cities. 
If the grant level of the nearby local governments increases by 1%, the grant level of a local 
government is predicted to increase by 0.39%. 
Limitation 
The fixed effects model implicitly makes a parallel trend assumption. Since the fixed 
effects model controls time-invariant unobserved variables like indigenous characteristics of 
local governments, this study also assumes that childbirth grants in any two local governments 
would have increased at the same rate if those local governments had the same value of the 
explanatory and control variables. Potentially, there might be time-varying unobservable factors 
which have an impact on the dependent variable and measurement error resulting in biased 
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results. While I assumed that local culture such as preference for lager families is time invariant 
factor, there is the possibility that the local culture changes over just a few years. In addition, the 
characteristic of a local council which I did not consider in this study, can affect the grants 
because the budget of a local government has to be approved by the local council. 
 
6. Conclusion and Recommendation 
The aging population and declining birth rate have emerged as one of the top policy 
issues in South Korea. To increase the birth rate, the government of South Korea has been 
enacting several fertility encouragement polices. Although all the policies have been led by the 
central government, a childbirth grant program was initiated and diffused by primary local 
governments. However, the grant levels vary significantly between the local governments. 
Therefore, my study examined what caused the different in the grants paid out by the 
local governments with a focus on population and fiscal independence of the local governments. 
I chose a fixed effects model to address the potential endogeneity from time invariant factors. 
Population change had a statistically significant impact on the childbirth grant level of 
primary local governments in the provinces while it had no significant impact on that of 
metropolitan municipalities. By contrast, the fiscal independence rate did not have much impact 
on the grant level except a subtle influence on that of metropolitan municipalities. Interestingly, 
the grant level of nearby primary local governments has a positive effect on a local government’s 
grant level both in the provinces and metropolitan cities. 
From the estimation results, we can know that, although the stated goal of childbirth 
grants is increasing births, a competition among the local governments not to lose young 
population to another nearby local governments contributes to increasing childbirth grants. 
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Losing young people means further aging of the population and creates the potential to have 
reduced administrative organization, and to lose representation in the national congress. This is 
because the size of organization and the number of seats in the national congress is mainly 
determined based on population of the primary local government. Unlike metropolitan 
municipalities, the majority of local governments in the provinces are small cities and towns. To 
some local governments, the dwindling population is serious enough to threaten the very 
existence of the local government itself. This suggests why the population change has a 
significant impact in the provinces. 
There is a need for the central government of South Korea to intervene in the childbirth 
grant policies of primary local governments in the perspective of pursing balanced regional 
development as well as increasing the birth rate. The primary local governments experiencing 
depopulation tend to be municipalities having relatively larger rural areas because people, 
especially young people, are likely to leave for metropolitan cities looking for jobs or better 
living conditions. Also, the fiscal capacity of a small city tends to be weaker compared to those 
of big cities having lager urban areas. It means that the local government having lower 
population growth is easily tempted to increase the grants in order to prevent the population 
outflow even though its fiscal conditions is not good. Therefore, to alleviate financial burden on 
small local governments, I recommend the central government introduce differential matching 
funds for childbirth grants depending on the characteristics of the primary local governments 
such as population size and fiscal capacity. 
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Appendix 
a. Summary Statistics of Childbirth Grants 
Unit: thousand Korean Won (1100 KRW ≒ 1 USD) 
Year 
Weighted Ave. First Child Second Child Third Child Fourth Child 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
2005 268 188 167 216 247 841 627 841 695 1,063 
2006 292 180 139 273 267 1,479 833 1,479 850 1,564 
2007 433 246 166 463 391 1,798 1,384 1,798 1,490 2,104 
2008 435 290 182 474 400 1,706 1,437 1,706 1,495 1,958 
2009 487 360 195 952 496 1,860 1,534 1,860 1,704 2,293 
2010 511 406 214 630 500 2,046 1,655 2,046 1,909 2,554 
2011 597 420 226 697 576 2,136 1,845 2,136 2,201 2,695 
2012 667 471 244 792 674 2,169 1,985 2,169 2,411 2,838 
2013 687 475 250 809 704 2,310 2,114 2,310 2,558 2,946 
2014 692 474 251 807 707 2,303 2,123 2,303 2,635 2,997 
2015 722 490 275 872 732 2,337 2,177 2,337 2,720 3,087 
Source: Data collected from primary local governments 
 
b.  Hausman Test 
Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
 chi
2 Prob>chi2 
Whole PLG 26.37 0.0033 
PLG in Province 22.30 0.0136 
PLG in Metropolis 36.06 0.0001 
 
